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原題目題號：DSE-2018-Essay-04
國際社會於1919-39年間為維持歐洲和平所作出的嘗試取得了多大成效？
一次大戰後，國際社會為避免再次爆發大戰，進行了一系列的嘗試以維持歐洲和平，包括維和機構、和平條約、裁軍會議，和平會議、綏靖政策、互助條約、互不侵犯條約等。然而，此等嘗試大多失敗告終，僅維持了1920年代的短期和平，長遠卻未能阻止下一次大戰的爆發。
國際社會以集體安全體系的方式維繫了1920年代短期的歐洲和平。國際社會成立國聯，又簽訂和平條約及舉行裁軍會議，有助營造出1920年代的歐洲蜜月期。國聯方面，其解決了部分國家的糾紛，例如成功阻止了意大利於1923年炮轟希臘科孚島；迫使希臘於1925年停止侵略保加利亞，有助平息衝突。和平條約方面，《羅加諾公約》中規定比、法、德的邊界必需維持現狀，《凱格—白里安公約》的簽約國則同意維持世界和平，放棄戰爭手段，有助營造和平氣氛。裁軍會議方面，其中華盛頓會議規定了英、美、日、法、意的主力艦比例為5：5：3：1.75：1.75。此外，倫敦海軍會議也規定了美、英、日的大型巡洋艦比例為5：5：3，有助限制參與國的軍備數量。可見，集體安全體系有助營造1920年代歐洲的和平氣氛，使蜜月期出現。
然而，仔細就逐一努力去衡量，國際社會的努力未能有效長久的和平。
其一，維和機構未能有效維持歐洲的和平。美國總統威爾遜於1919年巴黎和會中提出「和平十四點」，其中一點是成立一個全球性組織，即國聯。國聯面對侵略國首先會提出指責，指責無效便會實施經濟制裁，再無效便會作出軍事行動。然而，國聯沒有正規軍隊，所有經費及軍力都依靠列強支撐，英法等國一衰弱，國聯便弱點全露。而且，一些大國如美、蘇等國亦沒有同一時期加入國聯，使國聯缺乏大國支持而變得無力。而國聯的無能更助長了侵略國的野心，例如意大利於1935年入侵阿比西尼亞時，國聯制止不果，意大利更於1937年退出國聯，其後更肆無忌憚地於1939年入侵阿爾巴尼亞。可見，國聯的無能反助長侵略者的野心，維和努力成效欠奉。
其二，國際社會以和平條約的方式去維繫歐洲和平的努力是失敗的。為達致和平，西方國家於1920年代簽訂了兩條和平條約，希望藉和平條約以減少領土衝突及支持以非武力方式解決紛爭。因此，1925年的《羅加諾公約》及1928年的《凱格—白里安公約》應運而生。然而，和平條約成效甚小，因和平條約並無罰則，故各國可從可不從。《羅加諾公約》中並未有確立德國東邊邊界的領土，而東邊正正存在著許多新成立的民族小國，故令德國日後向東擴張，例如1939年德國入侵捷克等。再者，《凱格—白里安條約》中「合法的防衛」就成為日後侵略國的藉口，如德國於1938年藉保護蘇台德區的日耳曼人為名，要求合併之。可見，和平條約未能有效限制野心國的行動，成效失敗。
其三，國際社會以裁軍方式推動和平的成效甚低。列強為了緩和軍備競賽以達致減少戰爭爆發，亦進行了三次的裁軍會議，分別是華盛頓會議(1921-22年)、倫敦海軍會議(1930年)及日內瓦裁軍會議(1932-4年)。然而，華盛頓會議只是限定主力艦及航空母艦，但對其他海軍軍備就未能達成共識。倫敦海軍會議的簽署國少，只有美、英、日三國。同時，華盛頓會議和倫敦海軍會議只是針對海軍，並無對陸軍及空軍進行規定。儘管日內瓦會議雖是一次普遍性裁軍會議，但由於德國認為《凡爾賽條約》中已裁減了，故其他國亦應裁減，否則德國便可重整。由於各國未能就裁軍問題達成協議，德國更於會議中途退出，令各國擔心德國死灰復燃，反加緊擴張軍備。可見，各國為裁軍所作的努力存有許多局限，成效不宜高估。
其四，會議方式以維護歐洲和平的努力是失敗的，更埋下了二戰爆發的伏線。列強於兩次大戰期間舉行和平會議以解決衝突及戰後問題，例如在第一次世界大戰後，列強召開了巴黎和會，制訂出對德的《凡爾賽條約》及對奧的《聖澤門條約》。然而，會議方式並未能有效解決問題。因巴黎和會嚴懲德國，例如賠款330億美元及承擔全部戰爭罪責，導致了德國的強烈不滿，有助納粹希特拉於1933年上台。此外，由於英、法未能兌現1915年倫敦會議中的承諾，將阜姆、達爾馬西亞給予意大利，結果使意大利極為不滿，有助1922年法西斯墨索里尼的上台。同時，會議上雖然提出了民族自決的原則，但德國日耳曼民族卻不享受此原則，令日後德國以民族自決為由，進行侵略，例如1938年要求取回居住了300萬日耳曼人的蘇台德區。可見，會議方式不但未能維護和平，更帶來了許多的後遺症。
其五，英、法以綏靖政策維持和平的方式同樣以失敗告終。一戰的破壞及經濟大蕭條的影響使英、法經濟衰落，無力阻止侵略出現，故採取綏靖政策，試圖以退讓的方式滿足侵略國的野心，如於1935年德國重新徵兵時，英、法並無以實際行動阻止，英國更與德國達成《英德海軍協定》，准許德國軍艦噸位達到英國的35%。然而，綏靖政策加劇了侵略者的氣焰，反助長侵略出現。例如英、法於1935年德國重新徵兵及1936年將萊茵河重新軍事化時未有阻止，使德國進一步將野心擴展至居住有600萬日耳曼人的奧地利，強迫奧地利與德國合併。及後，英、法於1938年慕尼黑會議中，英、法犧牲捷克斯洛伐克的利益，將蘇台德區轉讓予德國，反增加了德國的野心，使德國於1939年吞併捷克全境，更於1939年突襲波蘭，迫使兩國需要放棄綏靖政策，對德宣戰，綏靖政策正式失敗告終。可見，綏靖政策也是徹底失敗告終。
其六，各國嘗試以互助條約的方式維持和平，成效同樣欠奉。為了防止受到侵略國的攻擊，部分國家締結防守陣營，如法國於1925年分別與波蘭及捷克斯洛伐克簽訂《互助條約》，規定若一國受到他國攻擊時，另一簽署國需要援助。另外，於1935年德國重新徵兵後，法國也與蘇聯簽訂《互助條約》，以加強防衛能力，阻止他國入侵。然而，各國均以自身利益為依歸，條約並不能發揮實際效用，如德國於1939年入侵捷克斯洛伐克時，法國因恐會捲入戰爭而未有提供援助。同樣地，蘇聯恐懼德國入侵，故與德國於1939年達成《互不侵犯條約》，使法、蘇間的《互助條約》失效，蘇聯於戰爭初期也未有援助法國。可見，互助條約的方式並未能發揮實際效用，更形同虛設。
最後，蘇聯為求自保，以互不侵略條約以維持自身安全的嘗試也是失敗的。由於蘇聯恐懼德國的擴大最終會使其捲入戰爭，於答應德國的邀請，於1939年8月與德國簽訂《互不侵犯條約》，承諾兩國於十年內互不攻擊，使兩國保持和平關係。雖然條約規定德、蘇兩國於10年內互不侵犯對方，然而，於1941年，德國因恐蘇聯的持續強大最終會危害其安全，故落實「巴巴羅薩作戰計劃」，突襲蘇聯，使德、蘇戰爭於條約簽訂後兩年內爆發。可見，蘇聯以互不侵略條約嘗試維繫德蘇關係和平的方式也是徹底失敗的。
總括而言，儘管國際社會於1920年代營造出歐洲的蜜月期，但基於維和嘗試的種種缺失及局限，最終不但未能維繫長久的和平穩定，更使二次大戰於一次大戰結束後僅20年就爆發。因此，國際社會於1919-39年間維持和平的嘗試大多是失敗的。
How effective were the attempts to maintain peace in Europe by the international community in the period 1919-39?
After the First World War, there were different international attempts to maintain peace in Europe with a view to preventing another world war, including peacekeeping organization, peace treaties, disarmament conferences, peace conferences, appeasement policy, treaties of mutual assistance and non-aggression pacts. However, these attempts mostly ended up failing, creating short-lived peace in the 1920s but failing to prevent the next world war in the long run.
Through the collective security system, the international community maintained short-lived peace in Europe in the 1920s. These countries established the League of Nations, signed peace treaties and held disarmament conferences to create a honeymoon period for Europe in the 1920s. As for the League, it solved certain disputes between some countries, including the Italian bombardment of the Greek Corfu Island科孚島 in 1923 and the Greek希臘 invasion of Bulgaria保加利亞 in 1925, playing a role in settling conflicts. As for peace treaties, the Locarno Treaties羅加諾公約 guaranteed the borders of Belgium, France and Germany, and the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact凱格—白里安公約 agreed to maintain world peace and renounce war as an instrument of national policy. These treaties created a favourable environment for peace. As for disarmament conferences, the Washington Conference華盛頓會議 stipulated a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio of tonnage for capital ships with respect to Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy respectively, and the London Naval Conference倫敦海軍會議stipulated a 5:5:3 ratio of tonnage for heavy cruisers with respect to Britain, the United States and Japan respectively. These ratios limited the quantities of armament possessed by the signatories. Clearly, the collective security system contributed to the peaceful atmosphere and honeymoon period in the 1920s.
However, when these attempts by the international community are examined carefully one by one, one can notice that they failed to bring about permanent peace.
First of all, the peacekeeping organization failed to maintain peace in Europe. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, US President Wilson proposed the Fourteen Points和平十四點, one of which was to establish a world organization named the League of Nations. When dealing with aggressors, the League would first issue a condemnation, then impose economic sanctions when condemnation did not work, and finally take military actions when sanctions did not work. Nevertheless, the League had no armed forces and relied on the powers for financial and military support. Its vulnerability was shown once countries such as Britain and France were in decline. In addition, some powers such as the US and the USSR did not join the League at that same time. The lack of their support contributed to the League’s incapability that promoted the ambition of the aggressors. For instance, for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia阿比西尼亞 in 1935, the League failed to stop the aggression and Italy even left the organization in 1937. Unrestrained, the aggressor started another invasion against Albania阿爾巴尼亞 in 1939. Therefore, the impotence of the League of Nations promoted the ambition of the aggressors and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of this peacekeeping attempt.
Secondly, peace treaties also failed to maintain peace in Europe. For the sake of peace, Western countries signed two peace treaties in the 1920s in order to prevent territorial disputes and support non-military means for settling conflicts. They were the Locarno Treaties羅加諾公約 of 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact凱格—白里安公約 of 1928. However, these treaties were effective to a very small extent only since they entailed no punishment and the signatories could choose not to follow the terms. The Locarno Treaties羅加諾公約 did not guarantee the eastern borders of Germany that were shared by various newly-established nation states, promoting German eastwards expansion as exemplified by the invasion of Czechoslovakia捷克in 1939. Also, the Kellogg-Briand Pact contained a clause of ‘legitimate self-defense合法的防衛’ that was abused as an excuse by the aggressors. For example, in 1938, Germany requested the annexation of the Sudetenland蘇台德區 on the pretext of protecting the ethnic Germans there. Therefore, peace treaties were ineffective in keeping the aggressors in check.
Thirdly, the international attempts at disarmament were rather ineffective. In order to slow down the arms race and prevent wars, the powers organized three disarmament conferences, namely the Washington Conference華盛頓會議(1921-22), the London Naval Conference倫敦海軍會議(1930) and the Geneva Disarmament Conference日內瓦裁軍會議(1932-34). Nevertheless, the Washington Conference only led to the limitations on capital ships主力艦 and aircraft carriers航空母艦 with no consensus reached on other naval armaments. As for the London Naval Conference, the number of signatories was very limited. There were only three countries signing the treaty, namely the US, Britain and Japan. Also, both the Washington Conference and the London Naval Conference focused only on naval build-up and there was no mention of land or air forces. It was true that the Geneva Conference was a more comprehensive disarmament conference. Nevertheless, Germany considered it a must for other countries to disarm since the country already made disarmament efforts under the Treaty of Versailles凡爾賽條約, or else Germany would have the right to rearm itself. The lack of consensus on disarmament and the withdrawal of Germany from the conference aroused worries about the military revival of Germany and prompted the participating countries to start their military build-up. Therefore, such disarmament efforts had many limitations and their effectiveness should not be overestimated.
Fourthly, the attempts at keeping peace in Europe through conferences failed and even paved the way for the Second World War. The powers held peace conferences in the inter-war period to solve conflicts and reach post-war settlements. For example, after the First World War, they had the Paris Peace Conference to formulate the Treaty of Versailles凡爾賽條約 for Germany and the Treaty of St. Germain聖澤門條約 for Austria-Hungary. However, conference was not an effective way of solving problems. The Paris Peace Conference ended with heavy punishments for Germany, including US$33 billion in reparations and sole responsibility for its war guilt. This greatly upset the Germans and contributed to the rise of Hitler希特拉 and Nazism in 1933. In addition, Britain and France failed to keep their promise at the London Conference of 1915 and did not give Italy Fiume and Dalmatia. This greatly disturbed the Italians and contributed to the rise of Mussolini墨索里尼 and Fascism in 1922. Meanwhile, the principle of national self-determination民族自決 was proposed at the conference but it did not apply to the ethnic Germans, serving as an excuse for Germany to start invasions. For instance, in 1938, it demanded the return of the Sudetenland蘇台德區 with an ethnic German population of 3 million. Apparently, conferences did not bring about peace but caused various after-effects.
Fifthly, Britain and France’s appeasement policy綏靖政策 also failed to create peace. Plunged by the legacy of the First World War and the Great Depression into economic recession, the two countries were incapable of stopping aggression and adopted the appeasement policy as an attempt to satisfy the aggressors. For instance, when Germany reintroduced conscription徵兵制 in 1935, Britain and France did nothing to stop it, and the former even concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement英德海軍協定 with Germany that allowed the total tonnage of the German navy to be 35% of the total tonnage of the British Royal Navy. However, the appeasement policy only encouraged the appetites of the aggressors and led to more invasions. For example, Britain and France did not stop the German reintroduction of conscription in 1935 and remilitarization of the Rhineland萊茵河 in 1936, encouraging Germany to target Austria奧地利 with an ethnic German population of 6 million and forcibly annex the country. Later at the Munich Conference慕尼黑會議 of 1938, Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia捷克斯洛伐克 and gave the Sudetenland to Germany, but this only encouraged the Germans to annex the rest of Czechoslovakia and launch a sudden attack on Poland波蘭 in 1939, after which the two countries found it necessary to abandon appeasement and declare war on Germany. It was clear that the policy of appeasement ended in complete failure.
Sixthly, treaties of mutual assistance were signed to maintain peace but proven to be ineffective. To prevent being attacked by aggressors, some countries chose to form defensive alliances. For example, France signed treaties of mutual assistance互助條約 with Poland波蘭 and Czechoslovakia捷克斯洛伐克respectively in 1925 that guaranteed mutual assistance in case of foreign aggression. In addition, after the German reintroduction of conscription in 1935, France signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union to enhance their defense capabilities and deter foreign aggression. However, these treaties were not as effective as they were intended to be since the signatories’ sole concern was to protect their own interests. For instance, France did not provide Czechoslovakia with assistance when it was invaded by Germany in 1939 for fear of being embroiled in war. Also, the Soviet Union signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact互不侵犯條約 with Germany in 1939 out of fear for German aggression. The signing of a new treaty voided the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the Soviets actually did not support France at the beginning of the war. It can therefore be concluded that these treaties of mutual assistance did not serve their intended purposes and were largely ineffective.
Last but not least, the Soviet Union’s attempt at self-preservation with a non-aggression pact also ended up failing. Worrying that German territorial expansion would eventually get the Soviets involved in war, the USSR accepted Germany’s invitation and signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939. They agreed to take no military action against each other and remain peaceful for the next 10 years. Despite the 10-year non-aggression pledge, Germany adopted Operation Barbarossa巴巴羅薩作戰計劃 and launched a surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 for fear that the strong Soviet presence would eventually be a threat to its national security. A war between Germany and the Soviet Union broke out only 2 years after the non-aggression pact was signed. Therefore, the Soviet attempt to maintain peace between Germany and the USSR with a non-aggression pact was also a complete failure.
In conclusion, the international community did create a honeymoon period in Europe in the 1920s; however, due to the flaws and limitations of its peacekeeping attempts, it did not create permanent peace and stability but caused the Second World War to happen only 20 years after the First World War. Therefore, the international attempts at peacekeeping in the period 1919-39 were mostly failed.
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